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CRISIS IN NARCOTICS-ARE EXISTING FEDERAL
PENALTIES EFFECTIVE?
MARY M. BURNETT*
The increasing use of narcotics of all types has been an unfortunate
corollary of the growth of our urban areas and the mounting pres-
sures of our complex urban society. Many legislative attempts have been
made to solve, or at least to control, this distressing problem. There
is considerable doubt, however, as to the fairness and effectiveness of
the federal statutes.
Congress has written severe penalty provisions into our federal nar-
cotic drugs, marihuana, and dangerous drug (including LSD) con-
trol laws,' not so much for the purpose of punishing the offender who
possesses, sells, manufactures, or otherwise produces or deals with
them in violation of the law, but rather to deter people, be they young
*A.B., Roanoke College; LL.B., Georgetown Law Center; former law clerk to Hon.
Burnita Shelton Matthews, U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia; mem-
ber, District of Columbia Bar.
1. The terms "narcotic drugs," "marihuana," and "dangerous drugs" have different
meanings under the federal statutes and each is governed by its own set of laws
which creates confusion, disunity, and inequity where the penalty provisions are
concerned.
"Narcotic drugs" are the addictive drugs defined in 26 U.S.C. S 4731(a) (1954) and
include heroin, cocaine, morphine, and any of the opiate derivatives. See Bowman,
Narcotic Addiction and Criminal Responsibility Under Durham, 53 GEo. LJ. 1017
(1965), for a discussion of narcotic drugs and the addict.
"Marihuana" is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 4761 (1964). According to Henry L. Giordano,
Associate Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in his article ap-
pearing in the Nov., 1968, FBI LAW ENFORcEMENr BULL., entitled Marihuana-A Call-
ing Card to Narcotic Addiction, p. 2, 3: "[tlhe term 'marihuana' embraces all the
fancy and vernacular names you hear-the so-called 'American type,' the so-called
'Mexican type,' 'hashish,' 'bhang,' 'ganja,' 'charas,' 'cannabis,' 'cannabis resins,' 'can-
nabinol,' 'tetrahydrocannabinol,' 'pot,' 'tea,' or 'weed.'" Marihuana apparently does
not produce addiction although its use is habit-forming, resulting in a psychological
dependence upon it by the user.
The "dangerous drugs" commonly refer to three classes of non-narcotic drugs
which are habit-forming or have a potential for abuse because of their stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect. The stimulants are the amphetamines or "pep"
pills; the depressants are the barbiturates, otherwise known as "goofballs;" while the
hallucinogens are the psychedelic drugs such as LSD. See Amendments to the Fed-
eral Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act-H.R. 14096, S. REP. No. 1609, Cong., 2nd
Sess. 2-3 (1968), for a detailed explanation of these dangerous drugs.
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or old, from participating in any activity connected with their use
except for medicinal or research purposes.
Surprising as it may be to those in the legal profession and elsewhere
who expound the uniqueness of each individual and his right to be
treated accordingly, even when involved with an infraction of the
law, there is another reason leading our legislators to sanction imposi-
tion of heavy penalties against violators of the drug statutes. It stems
from the pronouncements of law enforcement agents that their job of
controlling drug traffic will be made easier if broader and more severe
penalties exist. These agents feel that while the laws against posses-
session, for example, act as deterrents, more importantly, they are
valuable in enforcement work against traffickers. The Government's
case is made easier to prove by removing the necessity of proving a
sale, or the intention of a sale, where the agents are confident that
they have apprehended a trafficker but have no hard proof as to a
specific sale. In addition, this sort of sanction, they say, is helpful in
furnishing an incentive for a person apprehended for simple possession
to cooperate with the police by disclosing the source of his supply.2
Neil L. Chayet, a Boston attorney and Assistant Professor of Legal
Medicine at Boston University, pointed out in his article, "Why Mas-
sachusetts Must Change Its Drug Abuse Laws," 3 that, while the pro-
ponents of a section under the Massachusetts law which makes it a
felony to be in the presence of a person, knowing him to have illegal
drugs, argue that this makes enforcement of the law much easier, what
really happens is that large groups of people may be scooped up with
little attention being paid to whether or not those arrested were
aware of the fact that they were in the presence of the narcotic. A
young person charged under this provision, Chayet says, is virtually
forced to plead guilty to the charge, with the promise of probation
and a suspended sentence.4 Nevertheless the result is a felony convic-
tion, and he carries the stigma of a convicted felon with him for the
rest of his life.
Strong disagreement exists among sociologists, psychiatrists, crimi-
2. See the remarks of Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Criminal Division,
Department of Justice, Hearings before Subconm. on Public Health and Welfare,
Conn. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 90-32, at 12
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
3. Herald Traveler Magazine, May 5, 1968.
4. As discussed in greater detail, infra, under the federal narcotic drugs and mari-
huana statutes there can be no suspension of sentence, probation, or parole given to
violators. See 26 U.S.C. § 7237(d) (1932).
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nologists, and others as to whether a severe penalty for the conviction
of a crime is actually any deterrence to its commission, especially
where narcotic violations are concerned. Dr. James L. Goddard, Com-
missioner of the Food and Drug Administration, in testifying before
a House Interstate Subcommittee at hearings conducted in February
and March of 1968 on bills proposing to increase the penalties for
dangerous drugs, including LSD, stated that there was some evidence
in the decline in the usage of the drug LSD which was unrelated to
any penalties for its use, but rather was related to the "understanding
the young people are now beginning to develop with respect to the
implicit dangers of the usage of the drug, itself;"' he stated that:
[My] feeling with respect to deterrence, the effect of the law,
is most simply stated by pointing to the present situation with re-
spect to marihuana. If the estimates of usage are anywhere near
correct then one has difficulty understanding how the very severe
penalties attached to the Marihuana Tax Act have deterred people
from the use of the drug.6
The members of the medical profession who testified at these same
hearings, or whose views were incorporated therein, were, for the
most part, of the opinion that making the possession of dangerous
drugs a crime would be ineffectual as a deterrent to their use.7 Dr.
Stanley Y. Yolles, of the National Institute of Mental Health, said
that as a physician he had certain reservations respecting the penalty
for personal possession. He expressed concern that the law not be
implemented to the detriment of the very individuals that the law
was trying to protect "by keeping them from seeking medical help
when they need it because of a bad trip, et cetera, for fear of self-
incrimination." 8
On the other hand, Donald Miller, Chief Counsel of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, had said that it is reasonable to assume that the
5. Hearings, supra note 2, at 60.
6. Id.
7. Id. See also comments in these hearings of Dr. William A. Frosch, Asst. Med.
Dir., Bellevue Hospital, Psychiatric Division, N.Y. University Medical Center, id. at
210; Dr. Jerome H. Jaffe, Asst. Prof. of Psychiatry, the University of Chicago,
id. at 211; Dr. John Buckman, Asst. Prof. of Psychiatry, University of Virginia,
id. at 212; Dr. Edward J. Hornick, New York, id. at 214; and Dr. Robert B. Davis,
Syracuse, New York, id. at 214.
8. Id. at 182.
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fear of the law does deter many persons who might otherwise try
marihuana.9
Perhaps it is sheer fantasy, or at least wishful thinking, on the part
of legislators and their advisors who accept the theory that a stringent
penalty, particularly where the drug laws are concerned, really is any
deterrent to violation of the statutes. During the twelve years since
Congress added the present severe mandatory minimum sentences onto
the narcotic drug and marihuana laws, drug use has not decreased but
rather has reached alarming proportions.
Hardly a day goes by that the printed page does not carry with it an
article or comment on the increased use, especially of marihuana and
LSD, by people of high school and college age; and the figures quoted
seem to show that about one in every four to six students has had
some experience with these drugs.10 As for the barbituates and am-
phetamines-the sedatives and stimulants-the older generation has be-
come one of "pill poppers" who are steadily increasing their usage of
these dangerous drugs. 1
But what, one might ask, have the severe penalties of the drug stat-
utes to do with the student who experiments with marihuana or
the parent who pill pops, since these people, for the most part, come
from middle or upper middle class backgrounds; they have no intent
to commit criminal acts. The answer is simple. Vhile these people
may lack any criminal intent to violate the law, the fact remains that
they use, and hence must obtain and likewise possess the drugs which
they do use, which may well lead them into serious entanglement with
the narcotics laws and the accompanying penal sanctions.
Basically the penalty provisions for violation of the federal laws
pertaining to narcotic drugs and marihuana provide that where no
specific penalty has otherwise been provided-and the violation in-
cludes the crime of possession-the punishment for the first offense is
to be not less than two years nor more than ten; for a second offense,
not less than five nor more than twenty years; and for a third or subse-
quent offense not less than ten years nor more than forty years. In
9. Symposium Speakers Debate, The Marihuana Laws-a Cure or a Cage, AMA
NEws (Apr. 29, 1968) at 6.
10. Hearings supra note 2, at 62-64, 88, 89, 111. See also Reice, But, Morn, Every-
body Smokes Pot! McCAris (Sept. 1968), and Cohen, Students Seek to Legalize Pot,
The Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1968, § A, at 21.
11. See Blum, Pills That Make You Feel Good, REDBooK, (Aug. 1968); Gotts-
chalk, The Pill Poppers, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1968, at 1.
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addition the court may impose a fine of not more than $20,000 with
any of these offenses.'2
In the case of an illegal sale or transfer of narcotic drug or mari-
huana without the prescribed written order, the court must sentence
the offender to imprisonment for not less than five years nor more than
twenty years for the first offense, to not less than ten years nor more
than forty for a second or subsequent offense, and a fine of not more
than $20,000 may also be imposed. If the sale or transfer was made to a
person under eighteen years of age, or if there has been a conspiracy
involved, the penalty to be given is not less than ten nor more than
forty years with the possible addition of a fine of not more than
$20,000. Where the offense involves an illegal importation of nar-
cotic drugs or marihuana the imprisonment is to be not less than five
years nor more than twenty years for the first offense, and for a
second or subsequent offense, not less than ten nor more than forty
years. Again in each instance the court may impose a fine of not more
than $20,000.'3
It should be kept in mind that regardless of the circumstances sur-
rounding the specific case being tried, the court has no choice but to
sentence the previously convicted offender to the mandatory minimum
sentence spelled out in the statute. Absolutely no latitude exists for
exercise of judicial discretion in this respect. In most federal crimes,
while the maximum period of time the court may sentence the of-
fender is set forth in the statute, the minimum time the offender must
be sentenced is left in the discretion of the court imposing the sen-
tence. However, under the statutes just described, the minimum num-
ber of years set forth in the statute is the minimum to be imposed.
Of perhaps greater consequence is the fact that the statute prohibits
the court from exercising its usual discretion in suspending the sen-
tence where the case is a deserving one, or of placing the offender on
probation if the offense involved is a second or subsequent offense, or
is one involving a sale or illegal importation of the drug; moreover the
statute specifically prohibits parole. 14 In other words, the minimum
12. 26 U.S.C. § 7237 (1932); 21 U.S.C. § 174, 176(a) (1954).
13. For other penalty provisions connected with narcotic drugs and marihuana see
26 U.S.C. § 7238 (1954) (dealing with opium smoking); 21 U.S.C. § 176(b) (1909)
(covering sale of heroin to juveniles); 21 U.S.C. § 183 (1909) (dealing with illegal
exportation of drugs); and 21 U.S.C. §§ 184 and 184(a) (1909) (governing seizure and
forfeiture of drugs found illegally on vessels).
14. 26 U.S.C. § 7237(d) (1932).
[Vol. 10:636
CRISIS IN NARCOTICS
sentence miust be imposed by the court, and it is the actual period of
time the offender must remain behind bars.
Customarily, the indictment for a sale or illegal transfer of narcotics,
for example, is an automatic three count indictment, charging the de-
fendant simultaneously with violation of both the illegal possession and
illegal importation statutes, as well as with the illegal sale;15 whereas
an indictment for illegal possession is usually coupled with a charge of
violation of the importation statute.16 Obviously, in the first instance
a first offense conviction carries with it the possibility of a mandatory
minimum sentence of twelve years in the event of conviction of a sale
involving a single capsule of heroin, if the court imposed consecutive
sentences in lieu of concurrent sentences.17 In the case of a first offense
conviction of the tnvo-count possession and importation charge, the
sentence could be a mandatory minimum of seven years if the sentence
is not made to run concurrently. In either case, suspension of sentence,
probation, or parole is out of the question.
In the eyes of the sentencing judge it can make no difference that
the offender standing before him is the teen-age son of a doctor, law-
yer, or banker with a good school record, an excellent college future,
and no past history of conflict with the law, or a less fortunate mem-
ber of society whose mentality and background has lead him to a path
of poverty and constant entanglement with the law, or an addict with
a heavy narcotic habit, or a hardened parasitic individual who thrives
off the weaknesses of his fellow man. Each must remain incarcerated
for the same minimum number of years!
As for the penalties connected with the misuse of the so-called
dangerous drugs, i.e., the amphetamines, barbiturates, and hallucinogenic
15. The indictment in such case would charge the defendant with violation of
26 U.S.C. § 4704 (1954) (illegal possession); 26 U.S.C. S 4705 (1954) (illegal sale or
transfer); and 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1954) (illegal importation).
16. Here the defendant would be charged with violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4744 (1954)
(illegal possession of marihuana); and 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1954) (illegal importation of
marihuana).
17. By "consecutive sentences" is meant successive sentences or each sentence
succeeding the other in regular order. By "concurrent sentences" is meant that the
sentences run contemporaneously or together with each other. Usually the court
orders concurrent sentences but it may order consecutive sentences. In this respect,
see United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360 (1926); United States v. Campisi, 292
F.2d 811, (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 958 (1962); Yancy v. United States,
252 F.2d 554 (1958), aff'd 362 U.S. 389 (1960); and Beacham v. United States, 218 F.2d
528 (10th Cir. 1955). But see Borum v. United States, - F.2d - (U.S. App. D.C. No.
20,270, decided Dec. 21, 1967).
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drugs such as LSD, until quite recently possession for personal use
was not made an offense. The Drug Abuse Control Amendments Act
of 196518 provided for increased record keeping and inventory con-
trol over these drugs in an attempt to curtail their diversion into illicit
channels. However, possession for the purposes of sale or other dis-
position to another, outside of legitimate channels of trade, was pro-
hibited by the act and made a misdemeanor offense with a penalty
of up to one year in prison and/or a fine of not more than $1,000.
With the increased use of barbituates, amphatimines, and particularly
the hallucinogenic LSD, Congress decided to take another look at the
penalties imposed under the 1965 Act and as a result enacted a new law
which makes possession of LSD for personal use a misdemeanor for
a first offense conviction, and for subsequent convictions a felony
with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine of not more
than $10,000 or both. The penalties for illegal sale or unlawful
manufacturing or other disposal of the drugs was increased from a
misdemeanor to a felony with imprisonment of up to five years and/or
a fine of not more than $10,000.19 An unlawful sale to a minor carries
the penalty for a first offense of a fine not exceeding $15,000 and/or
imprisonment for not more than ten years and for a second and subse-
quent offense the imprisonment may be up to fifteen years in prison
and/or a fine of not more than $20,000.
The disparity between these penalties and those under the narcotic
drugs and marihuana statutes is obvious. Fortunately, the mandatory
minimum sentences have not been incorporated into the new law
and there is more leniency insofar as suspension of sentence and pro-
bation is concerned with the court free to exercise its prerogative to
suspend the sentence and place the offender on probation for one year
on its own terms where the crime is a first offense possession for per-
sonal use. It may even unconditionally discharge the defendant from
probation prior to the expiration of the probation period. Such dis-
charge under the statute automatically sets aside the conviction; like-
wise if during the probation period the convicted person does not vio-
18. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331, 333, 334, 352(n), 360, 360(a) (1964); and 18 U.S.C. § 1114
(1964).
19. H.R. 14096, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968). The new law amends the penalty
provisions presently existing in 21 U.S.C. § 331(q) (3) (1964); and 21 U.S.C. § 333
(1964). Arrests are already being made under the new law. See Comm. Docket No. 32-
182, Joe Emmett McDaniel; and Comm. Docket No. 32-218, Kenneth Ray Walton, both
in the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia.
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late any terms of probation, the sentence is automatically set aside
at the end of the probation period.
If severe penalties have failed to deter people from experimenting or
using drugs, they certainly have had no apparent effect in deterring
those individuals actually addicted to drug use.20 In 1962 the United
State Supreme Court, in Robinson v. California,21 struck down as un-
constitutional section 11721 of the California Health and Safety Code
which made it a crime for a person to be addicted to the use of nar-
cotics. The Court found that it was cruel and unusual punishment con-
trary to the eight and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution for
the status of being a narcotic addict to be punished through the proc-
esses of the criminal law. In comparing the addict with others of so-
ciety's unfortunates Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority of
the Court in Robinson, said:
It is unlikely that any state at this moment in history would
attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally
ill, or a leper, or to be afiicted with a venereal disease. A state
might determine that the general health and welfare require that
the victims of these and other human afflictions be dealt with by
compulsory treatment, involving quarantine, confinement or se-
questration. But, in light of contemporary human knowledge, a
law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would doubt-
less be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and un-
usual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 22
In his concurring opinion in the Robinson case, Justice Douglas stated
that drug addiction is more prevalent in this country that in any other
nation of the western world. He said:
It is sometimes referred to as "a contagious disease" .... But
those living in a world of the black and white put the addict in
the category of those who could, if they would, forsake their
evil ways. The first step toward addiction may be as innocent
as a boy's puff on a cigarette in an alleyway. It may come from
medical prescriptions. Addiction may even be present at birth.
... The addict is under compulsions not capable of management
20. A. Lr mst, THE ADDIC AND THE LAw, 82 (1965).
21. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
22. Id. at 666.
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without outside help. . . . Some say the addict has a disease,
others say addiction is not a disease but "a symptom of a mental
or psychiatric disorder." 23
In any event, the importance of the Robinson decision is that the
Court recognized the addict's plight and the inhumanity of punish-
ing him for his state of being. The Court did not have before it the
addict's predicament in obtaining drugs for his personal use due to his
addiction, and the resulting harsh penalties facing him should he be
caught.
S. Carter McMorris, who served as counsel for the defendant in
Robinson, maintains that it is cruel and unusual punishment to treat
as a crime any aspect of the addiction syndrome. His contention is
that addiction by definition comprises a physical status necessarily
dependent on possession of the narcotic, whether by virtue of the
withdrawal syndrome and the craving caused by the narcotic's absence
or by virtue of the direct effect upon the body of its presence in the
blood.24 In effect, Mr. McMorris seems to be saying that not only is
punishment of the status of being an addict prohibited by the cruel
and unusual punishment provisions of the Constitution, but likewise,
and with merit, that it is cruel and unusual punishment to punish
severely the person addicted to narcotics who possesses it for his own
use, or who, because of his addiction, is forced into a petty sale in
order to further his own habit.2 5 To date the courts have refused to
accept this argument.
However, in at least one jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, the
United States Court of Appeals has indicated that the time may be
coming when the addict will have available to him the defense of in-
sanity based solely on the fact of his addiction at least where the crime
involved is a violation of the narcotics statutes.2 6
Very recently this same court handed down a remarkable and un-
23. Id. at 669-72.
24. McMorris, Can We Punish for the Acts of Addiction, 54 A.B.A.J. 1081 (1968).
25. A large number of narcotic violations are charged against known addicts when
the amount involved in the sale is no more than one to four capsules, having a com-
mercial value of about $2.50 a capsule.
26. See Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492 (U.S. App. D.C. 1965), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 929, reh. denied, 382 U.S. 874; Gaskins v. United States, 394 F.2d 933 (US.
App. D.C. 1967); and Horton v. United States, 317 F.2d 595 (U.S. App. D.C. 1963).
But see Green v. United States, 383 F.2d 199 (U.S. App. D.C. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 961 (1968); Heard v. United States, 348 F.2d 43 (U.S. App. D.C. 1965).
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doubtedly far-reaching decision in the case of Watson v. United States, -27
holding that the mandatory minimum ten year imprisonment to which
the defendant, a convicted narcotic addict, was sentenced constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment.
In this ruling, the court of appeals pointed out that
"[t en years in prison is at least tvice as long as the maxinMm fed-
eral sentence for such major felonies as extortion, blackmail,
perjury, assault with a dangerous weapon or by beating, arson
(not endangering human life), threatening the life of the Presi-
dent and selling a man into slavery." 28
Hopefully, the Watson case will have the ultimate affect of outlaw-
ing mandatory minimum sentences, at least in the narcotic drugs and
marihuana statutes. But there seem to be many obstacles which must be
overcome before this can occur. In the meantime experimental users
of narcotics, marihuana, and the like, as well as the unfortunate ad-
dicts, are subject to being sent to prison for many years with no pos-
sibility of release if they are caught with the drugs. Interestingly
enough, in Watson the court candidly expressed its dilemma, indicat-
ing "reluctance at intruding upon the Congressional prerogative by
dismantling the narcotic sentencing statutes brick by brick," 2'9 until a
constitutionally acceptable result has been reached.
Indirectly, help may be coming sooner than is realized. The Supreme
Court has heard argument in the case of the much-publicized mari-
huana and LSD user, Dr. Timothy Leary.30 Although Dr. Leary was
sentenced for violation of the marihuana statutes to serve consecutive
sentences totalling thirty years in prison with a corresponding fine of
$40,000, the unconstitutional aspects of this sentence apparently have
not been directly raised in the petition before the Supreme Court. Dr.
Leary is now over forty years of age, and if his conviction stands,
thirty years in prison could well mean his life would end there.
Leaving to the courts the problem of correcting the severity of the
27. Watson v. United States, - F.2d - (U.S. App. D.C. No. 21,186 decided Dec. 13,
1968).
28. Id., p. 17 Slip Opinion.
29. Id., p. 20 Slip Opinion.
30. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 392 U.S. 903
(1968). The main questions presented to the Court in this case deal with the con-
stitutionality of the self-incrimination overtones contained irn 26 U.S.C. § 4741 (1964),
of the marihuana laws and the almost conclusive presumption in the illegal im-
portation statute, 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1954).
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penalties mandatorily to be imposed for violation of the federal drug
statutes is a lengthy process. A much quicker and more direct path
toward elimination of this cruel and inhuman treatment to drug of-
fenders would be for Congress to admit the error of its ways and seek
immediate review of these statutes with an eye toward elimination of
the mandatory minimum sentences and lifting the present ban on
suspension of sentences, probation, and parole, thereby permitting the
courts and the prison authorities to exercise their usual discretion in
this regard.
